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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY STEVENS IMPLEMENT COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and .A.ppella;nt, 
'VS. 
C. K. BOWERBANK, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action involves the cost of a party wall. Plain-
tiff and defendant are the owners of adjoining business 
property situate on Ogden Avenue, Ogden City, Utah. 
Each contemplated the construction of a new building. 
On the 11th day of December, 1945, and before any con-
struction had commenced, the parties entered into a 
written party wall agreement. It was mutually agreed 
that plaintiff would construct, as a part of its building, 
a party wall on the South, for their joint use. The 
agreement provided that the wall should be constructed 
in accordance with plans and specifications then being 
prepared by the architect employed by the plaintiff and 
that the boundary line as previously fixed by H. J. 
Craven and Son, Civil Engineers, (who had previously 
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surveyed the property and had marked the boundary 
line on the premises), should be established as the center 
line of the wall. 
The agreement further provided that as soon as 
plaintiff's building was completed to a point where the 
total cost was ascertainable, defendant would pay plain-
tiff. 
"the full one-half of the total cost of said· wall 
and one-half the cost of the survey." 
The agreement is silent as to how this total cost was 
to be ascertained. 
On or about December 1, 1945, Art Shreeve, a li-
censed architect, (who died before the trial), prepared 
general specifications for plaintiff's building, the South 
wall of which was to be the party wall in question, and 
invited bids for the construction of said building, in 
accordance therewith. The specifications contained the 
following provision; 
"This contractor is to state in his bid a lump 
sum amount for the construction of the South 
wall. ' ' See page 20. 
Three well-known and responsible contractors sub• 
mitted bids to the architect: C. B. Lauch Construction 
Company, Earl S. Paul, and Lawrence .Mayberry. 
Lauch's bid was for Sixteen Thousand Dollars 
($16,000.00) (Exhibit C), and it being the lowest bid, 
the same was accepted by plaintiff on the advice of its 
architect. 
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On December 18, 1945, Lauch wrote the architect 
as follows: 
":Jir. Art Shreeve, Architect, Kiesel Building, 
Ogden, Utah. December 17, 1945. 
Dear Sir: 'V e propose to construct a building 
for the Sidney Stevens Implement Co. of Ogden, 
U tab, as per your plans and specifications under 
date of December lOth for the sum of $16,000.00. 
Yours or Very truly yours, C. B. Lauch Con-
struction Company by C. B. Lauch.'' 
On December 18, 1945, Lauch wrote the architect as 
follows: 
'• :Jir. Art Shreeve, Architect, Kiesel Building, 
Ogden, Utah. In re Steven's Implement Building. 
Dear Sir: In compliance with the last paragraph 
on page 20 of the specifications for the above 
building, we quote you for the South (party) 
Wall, which includes the excavation, footings 
with reinforcing steel, columns, and brick wall 
all according to the plans and specifications, the 
sum of $4435.00 Yours very truly, C. B. Lauch 
Construction Company.'' (See Exhibit D) 
On December 26th, 1945, there was attached to the 
plans and specifications an addendum wherein certain 
changes were made in the plans and specifications. (See 
last sheet of plans and specifications, Exhibit B.) 
The only change which in any way related to the 
party wall was the following: 
Masonry. 
Page 19, Exterior Walls: Change to read as fol-
lows: 
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"Balance of walls to he constructed of Lava Ash 
Blocks, as manufactured by the Utah Concrete 
Pipe Co., size 10 in. x 8 in. x 16 in.'' 
The original plans provided as follows: 
''All exterior walls shall be 12 in. walls . . . ex-
terior walls common brick." (See page 19, Ex-
hibit B.) 
To fully understand the effect of this change, it 
should be noted that the plans call for the construction 
of reinforced concrete pillars which supported steel 
girders for the roof. The walls referred to above were 
the filling between these pillars and carried no weight 
from the roof. 
On December 26th and after the addendum had been 
attached, a written agreement for the construction of 
plaintiff's building was entered into. (Exhibit G.) The 
total amount was $15,377.00, making a reduction of 
$623.00 from the original bid. Lauch gave plaintiff an 
itemized statement in support of the reduction made 
possible by the changes in the original plan. (Exhibit 
P.) It showed a reduction in the cost of all the exterior 
walls of $200.00. The other items related to changes 
in the roof, the floor, and other parts of the building 
and had nothing to do with this wall. 
When the building had been completed beyond the 
entire construction of the party wall, plaintiff billed 
defendant for the sum of $2,217.50, plus $85.00 for a 
chimney placed in t~e wall for the exclusive use of the 
defendant. This chimney charge is not questioned and 
will need no further reference. 
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Defendant refused to pay the bill, contending the 
same was excessive. Plaintiff filed this action to re-
cover the above amount, with interest. Defendant ans-
wered, denying that the total cost to plaintiff of the 
party wall exceeded $2,530.00. Defendant also filed a 
counterclaim ag·ainst plaintiff. In this counterclaim de-
fendant alleged that after the execution of the party 
wall agreement defendant caused a survey to be made 
by one \Villiam Stowe, a licensed surveyor, to ascertain 
the true diYision line, and that it was ascertained by this 
surveyor that the Craven survey did not designate the 
true boundary line but that the same was 10% inches 
North of the line fixed by Craven, and that upon being 
so informed plaintiff and defendant, by mutual agree-
ment (orally) established the line as fixed by Stowe and 
agreed that the party wall should be constructed with 
this line as the center of the wall. That the plaintiff 
then proceeded with the construction of the wall and 
after its completion defendant discovered that the wall 
had been constructed on the Craven line and he prayed 
for damages in the sum of $1000.00. 
By its reply, plaintiff denied the existence of any 
valid contract as alleged, and alleged laches and estoppal 
as an affirmative defense to defendant's counterclaim. 
The case was tried to a jury. At the conclusion of 
the case, plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on de-
fendant's counterclaim. ( Tr. 159-160) The motion 
was denied, to which plaintiff reserved an exception. 
Plaintiff also, by its requested instruction No. 3, re-
quested the Court to instruct the jury to return a ver-
dict in favor of plaintiff as to defendant's counterclaim. 
This request was refused and exception taken. 
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The Court submitted the case to the jury on four 
special interrogatories which were answered by the jury 
as follows: 
1. What was the cost of the party wall in question 
to the plaintiff~ 
Answer: $2750.00. 
2. Did Frank J. Stevens, Jr., and Henry Stevens, 
either or both of them, mutually agree with 
the defendant as to where the division line of 
their properties was to be located and estab-
lish the same based upon the William Stowe 
survey~ 
Answer: Yes. 
3. Was the center of the party wall constructed 
along the division line of the properties as 
agreed upon? 
Answer: No. 
4. A. How far South of the agreed-upon division 
line of the properties was center of the party 
wall constructed~ 
Answer: 9.25 inches. 
B. What was the reasonable market value in 
the spring and early summer of 1946 of one 
foot frontage of unimproved property located 
on the East side of Ogden Avenue and approxi-
mately in the middle of the block between 25th 
and 26th Street~ 
Answer : $196.50. 
The Court received the answers, ordered the same filed, 
and thereafter, on December 30, 1948, entered findings 
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and judgment on the Yerdict, awarded plaintiff judg-
ment for $1375.00 and interest, and awarded defendant 
judgment for $151.42 and interest, and set-off this 
amount against plaintiff's judgment, leaving a balance 
due plaintiff of $1223.58 and interest from May 1, 1946. 
On January 6, 1949, plaintiff served and filed a 
motion for new trial. On January 26th, 1949, the Court 
denied plaintiff's motion for the reason the same was 
not filed in time. ( 041) 
Plaintiff then moved the Court to file the motion 
out of time under the provisions of 
Section 104-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
(047) 
and supported its motion by affidavit of counsel. (048) 
On February 11, 1949, the Court denied this motion. 
(052) 
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment and counter-
claim and also from the order striking plaintiff's motion 
for new trial and from the order denying plaintiff re-
lief if the motion was not filed in time. 
STATEMENT OF EVIDE,NCE 
At the outset, we might observe that the only ques,.. 
tion involved is 
''What was the cost to plaintiff for the construc-
tion of the party wall~'' 
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and the other question resolves itself into a question of 
law as to whether or not defendant is entitled to recover 
on his counterclaim. 
In summarizing the evidence we will attempt to 
confine ourselves to these two propositions, there being 
no dispute as to the other questions involved. 
C. H. Stevens, President of the plaintiff corpor-
ation, was the only witness called on behalf of plaintiff 
to establish a prima facie case. He identified, and the 
Court received in evidence, plaintiff's exhibits A to D, 
which were the party wall agreement, the plans and 
specifications, the Lauch bid, and the bid or break-down 
on the cost of the party wall. Exhibits E and F were 
not received. The Court received Exhibit G, the agree-
ment between Lauch and the plaintiff. The Court also 
received Exhibits H, I and J, which showed partial con-· 
struction estimates, certified by the architect, and paid 
by plaintiff to Lauch. The wall was completed before 
the :March payment of $8, 712.50. 
On cross-examination, it was disclosed that plaintiff 
was still withholding some $1500.00 from Lauch for the 
reason that the building had never been fully completed, 
and that an action was pending wherein Lauch was at-
tempting to recover this money. We make this obser-
vation at this point to clarify the reason why Hilton, 
Lauch's foreman, appeared to be an adverse witness. 
Lauch had left the state of U tab, and under date or 
November 17, 1947, he wrote a letter to Mr. Powell, 
attorney for defendant, in which he stated that the cost 
estimate of the party wall was $3127.00. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit L.) 
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By way of a defense, defendant produced as a wit-
ness Jack Hilton, who entered the employ of Lauch 
as Superintendent in April, 1949, after the Stevens build-
ing was well on its way to compleiton. He pointed out 
the change in the party wall from 12 inch brick to 10 
inch Lava Ash blocks. Then the Court, over plaintiff's 
objection, permitted him to give his opinion as to what 
it cost Lauch to construct this party wall, to which was 
added a profit of ten percent. (Tr. 32-34, Defendant's 
Exhibit 1) 
On cross examination, he admitted he had nothing 
to do with the construction of the wall. (Tr. 34) He 
estimated that the change from a 12 inch wall of brick 
to a 10 inch cinder block wall reduced the total cost of 
\ the entire building by at least $1200.00 and reduced the 
cost of the South wall by at least $1000.00. Tr. 36-41) 
He further admitted that the other changes in the plans 
reduced the cost to Lauch, and when asked why, if 
this were so, the contract was reduced by only $623.00, 
and where the excess went, he replied: 
''For the constructjon of the rest of the building, 
the contractor's overhead and profit, which I 
figure the contractor's profit is his own busi-
ness.'' (Tr. 41-45) 
He further admitted ~hat if ~the origmal bid was 
$16,000.00 and the cost was reduced by more than the 
reduction in the contract, that the difference must in-
evitably have gone into profit to Lauch and that he 
did not know how much profit Lauch made on the con-
tract. ( Tr. 42) 
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Defendant then called other contractors. Fred Carr, 
Jr., was permitted, over plaintiff's objection, to give an 
opinion to the effect that the cost of construction of this 
wall was $2348.87. (Tr. 57) Joseph M. Green, a sub-
contractor, was permitted, over plaintiff's objection, 
to testify what Lauch paid him for putting up the blocks, 
$926.00, although this did not include the upper portion 
of the wall. (Tr. 84-85) He stated he did not know 
what Lauch charged the plaintiff for this work. (Tr. 
85) 
Andrew Isaacson, a contractor, was also permitted, 
over plaintiff's objection, to give an opinion as to the 
cost of the party wall, which he estimated at about 
$2500.00. (Tr. 89) He also admitted that if the 
plans were changed and cheaper construction used, that 
the profits to the contractor would be greater unless 
the contract was reduced proportionately. (Tr. 95) 
In the estimate furnished by Lauch himself to Mr. 
Powell, (Plaintiff's Exhibit L), he listed the cost to 
plaintiff of the blocks as $1365.00, whereas, according 
to Green's testimony he paid Green $926.00. Tr. 103) 
By way of rebuttal, plaintiff also offered expert 
evidence, but in view of the jury's verdict it is unneces-
sary to review this evidence. 
We shall reserve a review of the testimony in sup-
port of defendant's counterclaim and treat that separ-
ately in connection with other matters hereinafter re-
ferred to. 
10 
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STATE~IENT OF ERRORS UPON WHICH 
THE APPELL~\.NT RELIES FOR A REVERSAL 
OF THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM 
1. The Court erred in striking plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial on the alleged ground that the same was 
not filed in time. 
:2. The Court erred in not allowing plaintiff to file 
its motion for a new trial out of time. 
3. The Court erred in admitting in evidence the 
opinion of the defendant's witnesses Jack Hilton, Fred 
Carr, Jr., Joseph M. Green, and Andrew Isaacson as 
to what it cost Lauch Construction Company to build 
the party wall. 
4. The Court erred in not instructing the jury as 
a matter of law the plaintiff was entitled to recover 
the amount prayed for. 
5. The Court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for 
a directed verdict as to defendant's counterclaim. 
6. The Court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's 
requested Instruction No. 3. 
7. The Court erred in giving the jury its second in-
terrogatory. 
8. The Court erred in giving its third interrogatory. 
9. The Court erred in giving its fourth interrogatory, 
Subdivisions A and B. 
11 
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10. The Court erred in entering its judgment on the 
verdict awarding plaintiff only the sum of $1375.00 as 
one-half the cost to the plaintiff of the party wall. 
11. The Court erred in entering its judgment on the 
verdict in favor of defendant on his counterclaim in the 
sum of $151.42, and off -setting the same against plain-
tiff's judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
We will endeavor to discuss each of the statements 
of error in the order above set out, grouping together 
those assignments which may be conveniently discussed 
together. 
Point No.1 
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING PLAINTIFF'S 
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MOVE FOR A NEW. 
TRIAL AND IN REFUSING TO HEAR OR CON-
SIDER SAID MOTION FOR THE REASON THAT 
NO NOTICE OF THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT WAS 
EVER SERVED UPON PLAINTIFF OR I'l'S AT-
TORNEY. 
The rules of practice adopted by the District Courts 
of the Second District provide as follows: 
''Rule 14. 
Preparation of Findings, etc: When findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment or de-
cree are required by statute to be in writing coun-
sel for the prevailing party shall prepare them 
and serve a copy upon counsel for the adverse 
12 
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party before deliYering- them to the Judge. Ad-
Yerse counsel's acknowledgment of receipt of 
copies, or if he refuses to acknowledge receipt, 
prevailing- counsel's certifieate of such service 
shall be suffieient evidence of service. A certifi-
cate by counsel for the prevailing party of mail-
ing· shall be sufficient where adverse counsel lives 
in a city or town different from that of prevail-
ing counsel. 
''Rule 15. 
Objection to Findings: On receipt by the 
court of findings, conclusions and judgment or 
decree in contested matters, served as required 
by Rule 14, the same will be held by the court for 
48 hours, during which time counsel must file 
objections to the same. Provided, that the court 
may, in his discretion, grant counsel additional 
time in which to prepare, serve and file written 
objections or amendments to the proposed find-
ings, conclusions and judgments or decrees, and 
may, in his discretion set time for arg-ument 
thereon. 
Rule 16. 
Preparation of Orders: All orders desired or 
required to be made in writing shall be prepared 
by counsel for the moving party, unless the matter 
is contested and gone to a final decision, in which 
case they shall be prepared by counsel for the 
prevailing party. 
"Rule 17. 
Notice by Clerk of Decision: When a decision 
is rendered by the Court upon a matter under 
advisement or in the absence of counsel, such 
counsel as were absent shall be given, by the 
13 
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Clerk written notice of the decision my mail. 
Such 'notices shall contain the name and number 
of the case a statement of the decision such as 
' 'Defendant's demurrer overruled' or 'Judgment 
for plaintiff.' 
''The presence of a member of a firm or one 
of the associate counsel at the time of the ren-
dition of the decision shall dispense with the 
notice to them. 
''Counsel in default or absent without cause 
shall not be entitled to notice. 
''Nothing herein contained shall affect or 
relieve counsel of the necessity of giving such 
notice to opposing counsel as the statute may re-
quire in the case either for starting time to run 
or otherwise.'' 
Pursuant to the above rules and in accordance with 
the practice which has prevailed for many years in this 
district, counsel for plaintiff prepared proposed Find-
ings and Judgment on the verdict of the jury and served 
notice on counsel for defendant that he was presenting 
the same to the Court as his proposed Findings and 
Judgment. The record shows the service was . made on 
the 24th day of December, 1948. The proposed Findings 
and Judgment were then left with the Court, unsigned 
and not filed. In accordance with the foregoing rules, 
the attorney who prepares proposed Findings and Judg-
ment has no control over the same thereafter. The 
trial Court must wait 48 hours to give opposing counsel 
an opportunity to file objections. If none are filed 
the Court may accept the Findings and Judgment as 
proposed or may make such changes as he may desire. 
14 
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There is no rule requiring the Court to sign the Find-
ings and Judgment as proposed, nor is there any rule 
requiring the Court to sign the same at the expiration 
of the 48 hours or in any other time. The trial Judge 
may and frequently does bold them on his desk for days 
or weeks before actually signing the proposed Findings 
and Judgment. The record here discloses that the pro-
posed Findings and Judgment were not signed by the 
Court until the 30th day of December, 1948. This rule 
of practice discloses the reason for rule 17, which re-
quires the Clerk to give written notice to the absent 
counsel. No such notice was ever given, either in writing 
or orally, by the Clerk to counsel for plaintiff and counsel 
did not know that the Findings and Judgment bad been 
signed until several days later. Immediately upon learn-
ing that the trial Court bad signed and filed the pro-
puosed Findings and Judgment, with modifications and 
changes as made by the Court, he immediately prepared, 
served and filed plaintiff's notice of intention to move 
for a new trial. This was filed on the 6th day of J anu-
ary, 1949, only 7 days after the Court bad signed the 
Findings and Judgment on the verdict, as modified by 
him. 
When the motion for a new trial came on to be 
heard, counsel for respondent made oral objections 
to arguing the motion, for the reason that notice of 
motion was not filed within five ( 5) days after the entry 
of the judgment. The Court relied upon the case of 
Cody vs. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 
154 Pacific 952, 
construing 
15 
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Section 104-40-4, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, 
and thereupon struck plaintiff's motion and refused to 
hear or decide the same. 
We believe the Court was in error for two reasons. 
First, we contend that the rule announced in Cody 
vs. Cody does not apply where the rules of practice pro-
vide otherwise. If, as appears from the Cody case, 
counsel presents to the Court Findings and Judgment 
~ the Court immediately signs the same, then of course 
we could see no reason why he should have notice of 
the signing of the Findings, but where, as in our case, 
counsel in whose favor the judgment is entered pre-
pares proposed Findings and counsel on the other side 
has 48 hours to propose amendments, and neither party 
knows when the Findings and Judgment are actually 
signed, then it does seem to us that counsel on both sides 
are placed on an equal footing. Hence the adoption of 
Rule 17 which requires the Clerk of the Court to give 
written notice to absent eounsel. 
If the rule announced in the Cody case is followed 
under the rules of practice adopted by this district, the 
counsel who prepares proposed Findings must, at his 
peril, call the Court every day to find out if and when 
the Findings and Judgment are actually signed. Such 
a rule would place an unreasonable burden upon attor· 
neys. 
Second, we further contend that the Court erred in 
striking plaintiff's motion for a new trial for the ad-
16 
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ditional reason that no written motion to strike was ever 
served or filed by opposing counsel. Rules and orders 
made by the trial court, except as to admissibility of 
evidence during the trial, must be raised by some form 
of pleading or written motion, so that issues may be 
made and Findings and Judgment entered thereon. Such 
is and always has been the recognized procedural prac-
tice in the Courts of this state, both in the trial Courts 
and in this Court. Motions to quash service of sum-
mons, to strike pleadings, to grant extensions of time, 
to amend pleadings, to bring in new parties, to strike 
bills of exceptions, dismiss actions, or dismiss appeals 
all must be in writing and served upon adverse counsel 
pursuant to 
Section 104-42-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943. 
Point No.2. 
EVEN THOUGH THE MOTION WAS FILED OUT 
OF TIME, YET THE COURT EJ:RRED IN REFUS-
ING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF RELIEF UNDER SEC-
TION 104-14-4. 
When the trial Court struck plaintiff's motion for 
a new trial, counsel immediately filed a written motion 
for relief to file out of time. The motion was supported 
by affidavit of counsel. At most, the ruling striking the 
motion was purely technical. The motion for new trial 
was actually filed within 7 days after the judgment was 
entered. No prejudice was shown or even suggested. It 
seems to us that the trial Court clearly abused his dis-
cretion in denying plaintiff's motion and in not per-
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mitting plaintiff to file the same out of time, in view of 
the frequent pronouncements of this Court favoring the 
disposal of matters on their merits rather than upon 
mere technicalities. This Court has been very liberal 
in permitting the setting aside of default judgments, as 
well as in granting other relief out of time where the 
parties have acted with dispatch and no prejudice has 
resulted to the opposing party. We say, therefore, the 
Court committed reversible error both in striking plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial and in any event in refusing 
to grant the relief asked for under the provisions of 
Section 104-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
Point No.3. 
IN THE ABSENCE: OF A MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL THIS COURT MAY NEVERTHELESS RE-
VIEW ON THIS APPEAL PRACTICALLY ALL THE 
ERRORS RELIED UPON FOR A REVERSAL. 
Should this Court sustain the rulings of the lower 
Court striking plaintiff's motion for a new trial, yet 
we contend that upon appeal this Court can review all 
orders, rulings and decisions of the lower Court relied 
upon for a reversal under the provisions of Section 
104-41-5, as construed by the case of 
Law vs. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98 Pac. 300. 
Point No.4 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVI-
DE.NCE THE OPINION OF DEF.ENDANT'S WIT-
NESSES HILTON, CARR, GREEN, AND ISAACSON, 
AS TO THE AMOUNT IN THEIR OPINION IT 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
WOULD COST LAUCH TO CONSTRUCT SAID 
PARTY 'VALL AND IN PER~IITTING THE JURY 
TO INFER OR DEDUCE THEREFROM WHAT 
AMOUNT LAUCH CHARGED PLAINTIFF FOR 
SAID CONSTRUCTION. 
Assignment No. 3, 4 and 10 all relate to the fore-
going proposition and can be discussed together. 
When the parties entered into the party wall agree-
ment, defendant knew and understood that plaintiff was 
about to commence the erection of a building upon its 
property and that plans and specifications were then 
being prepared by its architect. (The agreement so 
states.) No formula, however, was provided in the 
agreement for determining the cost. All the agreement 
provided was that when costs of the party wall were 
ascertainable, the defendant would pay one-half the 
cost thereof. The trial Court, correctly, we think, con-
strued the agreement to mean that defendant agreed to 
pay plaintiff one-half of the actual cost to it for this 
wall. It was not a case of paying one-half the reasonable 
value of the wall nor one-half the reasonable cost based 
upon quantum meruit, but one-half the actual cost. If, 
by chance, plaintiff was imposed upon and paid too 
much for the wall, the defendant, by his contract, must 
share equally in plaintiff's bad bargain. How, then, 
was this cost to be determined 1 Clearly defendant knew 
that plaintiff was not going to actually construct this 
building. He also knew that the preparatory work was 
then in the hands of an architect who was actually pre-
paring the plans and specifications. Likewise the 
architect knew of the existence of this party wall agree-
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ment. Certainly, as a prudent architect, he could not 
submit to bidders separately a bid for the construction 
of the wall and a separate bid for the construction of 
the rest of the building. To have invited two separate 
contractors to take the job, one to build the wall and 
another to build the rest of the building, would not have 
been prudent or in keeping with ordinary construction 
procedure. We submit that the architect proceeded in a 
proper manner in determining a basis upon which to 
fix the cost of this wall. In his plans and specifications 
he provided that anyone desiring to bid on this job 
must separately state the cost of this party wall. 
Three responsible bidders presented him bids. 
Lauch's was the lowest, for a total of $16,000.00, and, in 
accordance with the specifications, he estimated the cost 
of the party wall at $4435.00. His bid, being approved 
by the architect, was accepted by plaintiff. 
It is our position that this acceptance fixed the cost 
to plaintiff for the construction of this wall just at ef-
fectively as the bid of $16,000.00 fixed the cost for the 
entire building. Had the question involved been the 
cost of the entire building, no one could have questioned 
that the cost to the owner would be the entire contract 
price, and if that is so, then why is not a cost of a seg-
ment of a building arrived at in the same manner? A 
purchaser might offer ten thousand dollars for a bunch 
of cattle. In the bunch might be one particularly choice 
animal, which he offered one thousand dollars as a part 
of the total purchase price. Certainly the acceptance of 
the bid for the entire herd would fix the cost of the one 
animal just as effe·ctively as if he had purchased only 
that one particular animal. 
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Defendant seems to contend that he was in no way 
concerned with the relationship which existed between 
the builder, the architect, and the owner. We deny this. 
We take the position that, under the terms of his con-
tract, defendant was definitely tied into this relationship 
because he in effect became a participant in the building 
of this wall to the extent that he agreed to pay a sum 
equal to one-half its actual cost to plaintiff. In the ne-
gotiations plaintiff had nothing whatever to do with 
fixing this cost. We submit it proceeded in the usual 
and customary manner. It first employed a competent, 
experienced architect, whose honesty and qualifications 
are not questioned. The responsibility then rested upon 
the architect to draw plans, supervise the bids, supervise 
the construction of the building, determine costs, and in 
fact assume complete responsibility. Such are the duties 
of an architect. 
Defendant intimates all through this case that the 
plaintiff had a motive in increasing the cost of the party 
wall to its advantage, but to imply such a motive to plain-
tiff likewise impunes the motives, good faith, honesty 
and integrity of both the architect and the contractor. 
Certainly there is no evidence of such improper motives, 
acts, or conduct by these parties. 
This Court, of course, will not presume that these 
parties acted dishonestly in fixing in advance an ex-
orbitant or untruthful cost of the party wall. The honesty 
and integrity of everyone is presumed until and unless 
evidence to the contrary is presented. We say, there-
fore, that the method arrived at for determining the cost 
of this party wall was arrived at in precisely the same 
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manner as was the cost of the entire building, and when 
accepted by the builder, it became the cost to him of 
such wall. True after the bid was accepted there were 
some modifications which reduced the bid by $623.00, 
$200.00 of which should be applied in reduction of the 
cost to plaintiff of the party wall. This matter will be 
discussed in more detail hereafter. 
If this Court concludes that we are in error in the 
position taken, and if some other method for determining 
costs is deemed the correct method, still the undisputed 
evidence in this case shows that the party wall actually 
cost the plaintiff more than the sum awarded by the jury, 
and therefore the answer of the jury to the special in-
terrogatory and the verdict of the Court entered thereon 
can find no support in the evidence. The evidence shows 
that Lauch bid the sum of $16,000.00 for the construction 
of the entire building in accordance with the original 
plans and specifications. However, before the contract 
was signed, certain modifications were proposed and ac-
cepted. (See last sheet of Exhibit B) As a result, the 
total cost was reduced by $623.00 and the written con-
tract was then executed, which called for a payment of 
$15,377.00. Only one of the changes in any way affected 
the party wall. Instead of a twelve inch brick, a ten 
inch lava block was substituted. According to Hilton, 
defendant's witness, who was superintendent for Lauch, 
this change effected a saving to Lauch of at least $1200.00 
on the total building and a saving to him of at least 
$1000.00 in the cost to Lauch for the construction of the 
party wall. Yet in making the reduction in the contract 
price, he reduced the same by only $200.00. (See plain-
tiff's Exhibit P.) 
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It may be that the contractor thereby obtained an 
advantag-eous barg·ain but again it must be remembered 
that we are not concerned with what it cost Lauch to 
build this wall. We are only concerned with what it cost 
the plaintiff. If, therefore, Lauch effected a savings to 
himself of $1200.00 by changing from brick to block, then, 
unless he passed this saving to the owner by reducing 
his bid proportionately, he thereby increased his profits 
or his prospects of profits by that amount. This no 
doubt is the explanation for his letter to ~ir. Powell. 
(Exhibit L) This letter was written by Mr. Lauch to 
Mr. Powell after a dispute arose between Lauch and 
plaintiff growing out of the contract, which dispute, 
however, had nothing to do with the party wall. In 
that letter he listed the cost of the blocks to plaintiff at 
$1365.00, notwithstanding Green testified that he, Lauch, 
paid Green $960.00 for the material and labor in placing 
these blocks in the wall, and we ·submit that plaintiff 
did pay Lauch far more than the actual cost to Lauch 
for the construction of this wall. 
Defendant offered no evidence as to what Lauch 
charged the plaintiff. Neither did he offer any evidence 
as to the profit Lauch actually made. All that these 
expert witnesses testified to was that in their opinion 
Lauch could have built the wall for a certain amount 
which was based upon their opinions as to the reason-
able cost for the labor and material, to which was added 
an arbitrary ten percent profit, but, as heretofore noted, 
the cost to Lauch certainly is not the cost to the plaintiff, 
nor is the assumed ten percent profit any proof of the 
actual profit made by Lauch on this job. 
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It is too well known to permit of serious argument 
that during the period in question contractors were not 
building buildings just for the experience. They were 
out to make a profit, and during this period exborbitant 
profits were made, as everyone well knows. · 
Had defendant offered evidence as to the propor-
tionate cost which the party wall bore to the entire con-
tract price, that is, say they bad offered evidence that 
the wall in question constituted thirty percent of the 
entire materials and labor supplied by Lauch in the en-
tire building, there might have been some argument as 
to its admissibility, but defendant did not choose to 
offer that line of proof. He apparently relied on the 
assumption that proof of the reasonable cost to Lauch 
was proof of the cost to plaintiff, an assumption, we 
submit, which can find no support in the evidence. We 
submit, therefore, that the answer of the jury to the 
special interrogatory, to the effect that the cost of the 
party wall to the plaintiff was $2750.00 and the judg-
ment entered by the Court based upon said answer find 
no support in the evidence, but that the evidence con-
clusively shows that the party wall cost the plaintiff 
$4435.00, less the $200.00 reduction made by the con-
tractor, or in any event not less than the $3127.00 as 
stated by Lauch in his letter of November 17, 1947. 
Point No.5 
T.HE COUHT EHRED IN DENYING PLAINTib,F'S 
MOTION FOR A NON-SUIT AS TO DEFENDANT'S 
COUNTER-CLAIM, IN DE.NYING PLAINTIFF'~ 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT THEREON, 
AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE THE JURY PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3. 
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By his counterclaim, defendant sought damages 
against plaintiff for breach of an alleged oral agTeement 
to place the party wall at a point 10=Y-J, inches North of 
the point where the wall was actually constructed. The 
lower Court submitted this issue to the jury in its In-
terrogatory No. ±, Subdivisions A and B, and the jury, 
by its answer, found that the division wall was placed 
91A, inches South of the agreed upon division line and 
assessed defendant's damages in the sum of $151.42. The 
Court adopted theanswers of the jury and awarded de-
fendant a judgment on his counter-claim in the sum of 
$151.42, with accrued interest, and off-set the same 
against the verdict and judgment for plaintiff. 
Defendant obtained title to the property from two 
sources, the first being a deed from F. J. Stevens Estate, 
the owner of the property. The description used in this 
deed starts from the Southeast corner of Lot 10 and this 
is the description pleaded by defendant in his answer 
and counterclaim. Defendant also obtained a deed from 
Ogden City (owner of a tax title). This description 
commences from the Northwest corner. By reason of 
some excess in Block 17 there appears to be a difference 
of about 101;4 inches, depending on which point of be-
ginning is used by a surveyor. 
Jack Ora ven was employed to make the survey. He 
fixed the boundary line and marked the same upon the 
premises. In doing this he used the description con-
tained in the Stevens deed. The party wall provided 
that 
''The boundary line as heretofore fixed by said 
surveyor (Craven) and marked upon the premises 
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shall be considered the center line of said South 
(party) wall, and that the same shall be con-
structed one-half thereof on each side of said line 
so established as aforesaid.'' 
After this agreement had been executed, hut before 
the contractor had started to construct said wall, de-
fendant employed one Stowe, Ogden City Surveyor, to 
resurvey his property. In doing so, he used the descrip-
tion contained in the tax deed, and from such description 
concluded that the correct boundary line was about 10% 
inches North of the line previously established by Cra-
ven. Over plaintiff's objection, defendant was permitted 
to testify substantially as follows: That after the Stowe 
survey had been made; he, in company with Stowe, went 
to the office of plaintiff and talked with Henry (Presi-
dent) and Frank, Jr., (Secretary) relative to the differ-
ence between the two surveys. That Henry got out the 
two descriptions and Stowe showed him where the dif-
ference was in the two surveys. (Tr. 105-107) That 
then Frank, Jr., and defendant went to the property and 
and that they told the foreman Richardson where to put 
the wall, but that the wall was built on the line of the 
Craven survey. He further testified that he was upon 
the premises when the footings were laid and he watched 
both buildings go up and was about the premises every 
day. (Tr. 112) On cross-examination he testified that 
he and ~-,rank, Jr., indicated the point where the wall 
was to be constructed and that thereupon Lauch's fore-
man made a mark where the wall was to he placed. (Tr. 
115) That the foreman was in charge of the work and 
that defendant was there on the grounds when the forms 
were put in and the wall constructed, and that he raised 
no objection until after the wall was completed. (Tr. 
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116) Stowe testified along the same line and on cross-
examination stated that there would be only a diffen~nce 
of -PI! inches between where Frank, Jr., and the defend-
ant fixed the line and where the wall was constructed. 
(Tr. 122) 
We contend that this evidence was erroneously ad-
mitted and that the counterclaim was erroneously sub-
mitted to the jury for the following reasons: 
1. STATUTE OF FRAUDS. The written party 
wall agreement fixed and determined the true boundary 
line between the properties, and provided that the center 
line of the party wall was to be constructed on this line. 
The effect of the alleged oral agreement was to transfer 
or convey to the defendant a strip of land, 10% inches 
wide, North of this line. We contend that such an oral 
agreement is void and unenforcible under the provisions 
of 
Section 33-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 
rrhackery vs. Knight, 5'7 U tab, 21, 
192 Pac. 263. 
Bybee vs. Stuart, ________ Utah ________ , 
189 P. 2d 118 
Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 
276 Pac. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417 
11 c. J. s. 638 
It is to be noted that it is not contended that either 
party was in default as to the terms of the party wall 
agreement at the time of the making of the alleged oral 
agreement. Neither is it claimed that there was a part 
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performance of the oral agreement so as to bring it within 
the provisions of 
Section 33-5-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
What defendant is seeking is the recovery of dam-
ages for failure to comply with the terms of an alleged 
oral agreement, purely executory, to place the partition 
line at a point 10%. inches North of the line established 
by a written instrument. 
2. NO SHOWING OF AGENCY. The second in-
terrogatory propounded to the jury, to which plaintiff 
took its exception, is confusing and the answer thereto 
makes it impossible to determine what was the jury's 
answer. The Court asked the jury specifically: 
"Did Frank J. Stevens, Jr., and Henry Stevens, 
either or both of them, mutually agree with the 
defendant as to where the division line of their 
properties was to be located and establish the 
same based upon the William Stowe survey~" 
The jury answered : 
"Yes." 
The Court asked three questions in one and the answer 
could be ''Yes'' to any of the three questions, but 
couldn't be a correct answer to all three. The jury may 
have believed that Frank, Jr., and the defendant made 
the agreement, and that is probably what the jury did 
mean by its answer, because he admitted going upon 
the premises with the defendant and agreeing upon a 
certain line which he contended was midway between 
the two lines, while Henry denied emphatically that he 
was a party to any agreement of any kind or character. 
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.· 
-· 
\Y e contend that, in the absence of evidence of such 
authority, a Secretary and Treasurer of a corporation 
has no authority to bind the corporation in relation to 
the giving away of its real estate. What this purported 
oral agreement amounted to was a giving up by the 
corporation of its claim to lOY2 inches of the corpor-
ation's real estate. No attempt was made to show that 
Frank, Jr., had any such authority to bind the plaintiff. 
3. ESTOPPAL. The evidence shows, without dis-
pute, that defendant and Frank, Jr., went upon the 
land, established a point where the wall was to be con-
structed, and that the foreman then marked the same 
upon the adjoining sidewalk. The contractor, Lauch, 
was employed by both parties to construct buildings 
simultaneously on each property, using the party wall as 
a wall common to both buildings. If, as contended by 
defendant, the contractor failed to place the wall where 
they had both directed him to do so, and there is not 
a scintilla of evidence that plaintiff had anything to do 
with it, then the fault was the contractor's and not the 
plaintiff's and he was as much the agent of defendant 
as of plaintiff. The evidence further shows that the 
defendant was in and about the premises every day, 
that he was there when the forms were put up for 
putting in the footings to the wall, and that he watched 
the work progress from that point to completion, and 
yet at no time did he make any complaint or assertion 
that the wall was not placed at the point agreed upon 
until after the wall was completed. Under such cir-
cumstances it seems to us that defendant ought, in equity, 
to be estopped from now claiming damages as alleged 
in his counterclaim. 
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Point No.6 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY, AS THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, THE 
VALUE OF HIS LAND PER FRONT FOOT. 
If, as contended by defendant, the South wall of 
plaintiff's building was placed 9.25 inches South of the 
point where the parties orally agreed that it should 
be placed, and if such agreement was binding, yet that 
fact would not give plaintiff title to the 9.25 inches of 
defendant's land for which plaintiff would be liable for 
its fair cash market value. In the first place, but for 
the written agreement fixing the boundary line, a most 
interesting legal problem is presented which would prob-
ably require a decision of this Court to settle, and that 
is, under the facts as disclosed where was the location 
of the true boundary line between the properties¥ De-
fendant acquired title through two sources, one of which 
was a deed from the previous owner. It is admitted 
that if a surveyor followed the description in this deed, 
the Craven survey is correct. The defendant also ac-
quired a tax title from Ogden City. It is likewise ad-
mitted that if the surveyor followed the description con· 
tained in this deed, the Stowe survey is correct. As a 
legal proposition under such a state of facts, where is 
the true boundary line f However, the parties, by the 
terms of the party wall agreement, removed this un-
certainty by establishing the line and there is no con· 
tention of fraud or mutual mistake involved. If there-
after there was a valid, enforcible agreement entered 
into between the parties that the wall should be con-
structed at the point designated by Stowe, and if there 
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\' 
was a breach of that agreement, and the wall was placed 
9.25 inches South of that line, what would be the measure 
of damages 1 Certainly not the market value of the 
land, because defendant has never conveyed or offered 
to convey to plaintiff this strip of land. At most it 
would be an enroachment upon the defendant's land to 
the extent of this 9.25 inches, and, while defendant could 
not compel a removal of the enroachment, yet the en-
croachment would continue only so long as the building 
stood, or in other words the situation is similar to an 
easement or right to encroach upon the defendant's land 
during the life of the building. This is very different 
from the obtaining of a fee to this property. The 
measure of damages would be the difference between 
the value of defendant's property before and the, value 
of the property after the encroachment. 
2 c. J. s. 33. 
However, there was no evidence upon which the 
jury could base a verdict. Therefore the most the de-
fendant would be entitled to recover would be nominal 
damages, and it was error for the Court to sumbit to 
the jury the fourth interrogatory and particularly Sub-
division B thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
It is appellant's contention that the Court miscon-
ceived the issue with respect to the issues presented on 
plaintiff's complaint by permitting evidence to be ad-
mitted to the jury as to what were reasonable costs to 
Lauch in the construction of the party wall and thereby 
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to penni t the jury to speculate or to erroneously deduce 
therefrom what Lauch in turn charged the plaintiff for 
th~ construction of this wall, and that such error was 
prejudicial to the plaintiff and requires a reversal of 
of this ease. 
It is appellant's further contention that the Court 
erroneously submitted to the jury the is-sues presented ·1 , 
by defendant's counterclaim and that under the undis-
puted facts in this case, this Court should direct the 
lower court to dismiss the counterclaim. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THATCHER & YOUNG, ·i 
Attorneys for AppeUant ~ 
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